I don’t wholey agree. You make it sound as though change is inevitable and democracy will eventually occur. The Establishment may very well be a wounded wolf, but the Reds have tried to back it into a corner. A frightened, wounded and cornered wolf is probably the most dangerous. It has a split moment to make its last attempt to secure its freedom or die.

I believe the next elections will reveal the hands of all players, but I also fear the government may try to cancel elections from occuring.

There have been a series of grenade attacks around Bangkok now, and nobody knows who’s doing it. If we look who is to gain from them, however, it’s not the Reds. The government is using the grenade attacks to justify increased grip on security and media cencorship and the harsh punishment of Red leaders. If the Reds want free media and elections, it makes no sense they’d be the culprits.

Abhisit has now been quoted in The Nation as having said elections will only take place in peace. But what if Abhisit or the PAD or someone else in the Establishment is behind the attacks? I believe they are, as they’re the only ones who benefit.

The risk is, either way, the security siuation will decline leading up to the elections and the government will claim elections cannot be held in that state. No doubt the PAD will do something to encourage this with protests and make the rest of the world believe Thailand is in trouble and the following actions may actually be necessary.

The PAD have formed a political party, New Politics Party, and through them have claimed only 30% of the government should be elected and the remaining 70% should be appointed; essentially, the PAD stands for the destruction of democracy. The only way they’ll get this realized is through a situation as such I’ve mentioned where they create enough havock to put off the elections and the military will suspend the 2007 constitution in favor of this sort of government.

What other choice do they have? You think the government, military and PAD are going to accept open elections? Losing power yet again to the lower class? I don’t think so.

So Thailand is on the brink; if elections are held, Puea Thai will probably win, if not by an outright majority, through a dual party coalition. If that happens, they may finnally have the power to destroy the old order and move forward as a real democracy. On the other hand, you have a violent and radical military/government backed by big business that’re bent on staying in power at all costs. Yes, we may end up finnally being a democracy, or we may slip into a regime not much different from Burma. It could go either way.

So what should the Reds do? Percieve this threat to democracy and continue to protest and demand elections, yet at the risk of creating the very situation they’re trying to avoid. Or should they stay quiet and hope the government/PAD/whoever stops throwing grenades and elections actually take place? I don’t know. If there are more protests, I’ll know why, however.

And while you guys were pontificating, in case you didn’t notice, the Mandate of Heaven passed. I hope you are aware of the consequences and make your plans accordingly.

Cheers

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704852004575257790134925082.html?mod=WSJ_World_LeadStory

Some excerpts:

1. “People on both sides of Thailand’s political divide with knowledge of the negotiations say that Mr. Thaksin’s interventions—which they say included a number of new demands that ended up slowing the talks intended to end the political standoff—delayed an agreement for new elections that would have enabled the protesters to call off their months-long rally. His machinations prompted the most senior opposition Red Shirt negotiator to quit in frustration, according to these people.”

2. “But in recent weeks Mr. Thaksin has kept in close contact with rogue military officers training a paramilitary “people’s army” to attack troops and turn Bangkok’s streets into a war zone, according to opposition members involved in the conflict.”

3. “At a luxury hotel near the Red Shirts’ camp in central Bangkok, a team of Mr. Thaksin’s lawyers and advisers regularly conferred with protest leaders and other negotiators to ensure that Mr. Thaksin was kept in the loop over the past several weeks.”

4. “People involved in both government and opposition camps say Mr. Thaksin urged hard-liners to come up with fresh demands that stalled the process, ultimately leading to the talks’ collapse.They say Red Shirt leader Veera Musikapong quit the negotiations in disgust.
“He was questioning why they were bothering to talk when Mr. Thaksin was delaying any progress,” says one person involved in the mediations. Mr. Veera is in army custody and couldn’t be reached for comment.”

I think the analysis you pointed to has a number of problems.

First, it’s not Abhisit’s constitutional prerogative to impose martial law; that decision wasn’t his to make. One could argue (I think rightly) that it was generally a good idea not to impose martial law, but at this point the difference is largely semantic. The state of emergency allows the government to do pretty much as it pleases anyway, so martial law would have done the government very little good in that sense. The big difference between martial law and the SOE is that under the former the military runs the show and the civilian government serves at the pleasure of the military, while under the SOE the military runs the show so long as the civilian government doesn’t see it fit to lift the emergency decree. In this sense, sticking with the SOE can avoid giving the impression that a coup has been staged, but those appearances seem to be fading anyway as the SOE is kept in place long after any “emergency” has passed (again, SOE is designed to deal with “emergencies,” not to solve long-standing political problems or round up people you don’t like).

Second, though I agree with the writer that this is not a class war (or at least not exclusively something about social class), I would take issue with both his general definition and his reading of the Thai case. Most important, the notion that the workers in Thailand are not sufficiently disenfranchised or exploited to stage a “class war” strikes me as ridiculous. Revolutions with prominent class dimensions often take place in relatively advanced societies where the lower classes are more educated and resourceful. Marx himself thought communist revolution to have been far more likely in advanced industrial societies than in relatively backward societies. Modernization theory predicts much the same thing (it’s modernization that leads to democratic revolution, not desperation or backwardness; moreover, it is precisely as a society becomes more affluent that demands for economic redistribution intensify).

For this reason, it strikes me that you can stage a “class war” whatever the gap between rich and poor (and whatever the level of desperation of the lower classes) so long as the goals are the abolishment of class distinctions or something like Marx’s “dictatorship of the proletariat.” Note that the Red Shirts want neither of these things. Their economic demands, in particular, are limited to greater economic opportunity, development, and some welfare programs. This is the reason why this conflict DOES NOT strike me as a “class war.” It’s not about the players; it’s about the goals.

So what is this, if not a “class war?” Don’t have time to go into this in detail right now, but this strikes me much more as a sort of civil rights movement than a movement for the reordering of class relations. The UDD’s demands are mostly focused on reforms in the system of government — a switch to a kind of government that guarantees equality before the law and operates accordingly to popular sovereignty (no reserve domains for unelected institutions, no subversion of the people’s will through coups and the like). Class comes in (together with ethnicity and regional origin) as one of the markers for the kind of identity that the members of the movement share (or at least as one of the markers that defines the constituency whose rights the movement claims to advance). As such, this is less of a “class war” than it is an “identity conflict” where class forms one of the dimensions of this identity.

As for whether Abhisit comes out of this “looking better than ever,” I have my doubts. I am on record (here and elsewhere) as saying that I believe his political career is essentially over beyond this stint as Prime Minister (which might itself last a few more weeks or months). I might still be wrong (my record on prediction isn’t especially stellar), but at this point I see no reason to walk this assessment back.

This is RSIS (Singapore) article I received by mail recently.

He claims that Abhisit came out of it all in a stronger position than ever.

How would you evaluate his claims?

AN AMERICAN assassin hired by a local Sukhumvit-based boss learns compassion the hard way in the movie Bangkok Dangerous. He eventually loses his nerve and is reduced to an emotional pancake. By contrast, in the real world of Thai politics, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva used “an iron fist in a velvet glove” tactic while dealing with the Red Shirts at Lumphini-Rajprasong. Abhisit avoided a critical error by not imposing martial law. Instead, he imposed a state of emergency.

The difference between martial law and a state of emergency is that the former weakens and destroys the economy in the long-term. Martial law is a sign of political weakness and authoritarianism. The suspension of civilian rule would have heightened human rights abuses. For these reasons, Abhisit was prudent not to impose martial law: it would have “killed the goose that laid the golden eggs”.

The Lumphini-Rajprasong Camp

The Red Shirt Camp, adjacent to Bangkok’s main shopping belt, was an area of 3,500 metres protected by wooden barricades, walls of tyres, and a cache of stolen weapons. The Red Shirts showered and slept there. They ate from mobile kitchens and make-shift stalls. The proprietor of one of these stalls named “Carlos” – who also works as a foreign embassy driver by day – identified groups of intelligence officers in surveillance-mode outside the Camp. He said, “Red Shirts for the poor, Yellow Shirts for the rich”. This was their slogan for class war. But was there ever one in the first place?
Some of the richest people in the world are Thai. Indeed, many Thai people in Bangkok experience a standard of living that is well above many of their Asian counterparts. Thailand is also home to several Thai billionaires. Thai culture tends to make even the richest-rich avoid ostentatious displays of wealth. Despite the value placed on humility, the neo-liberal capitalist machine is alive and well in the Land of Smiles. Class distinctions between the richest-rich and the poorest-poor remain stark.

Class War?

Not a few months ago, luxury cars were on display in high-rise shopping centres while a man without limbs begged for baht in his own urine several stories below along the filthy pavements of Ploen Chit. In a Sukhumvit Soi, a beggar-woman and her crying child live off refuse and restaurant waste. The World Bank, the UN and other world international agencies have held many seminars and conferences on rural poverty and more often than not, Thailand is included in some way or form. At least 19% or about 4 million people form the poorest poor in Thailand’s rural northeast; while the fewest poor are discovered in Bangkok with 1.9% or about 91,500 people.

Almost two years of sporadic demonstrations led “foreign experts” and armchair critics to predict that time was right for a “class war”.

Genuine class war draws from a build-up of tension between disenfranchised workers and the capitalists who exploit them. The surplus value of labour is thus squeezed out by offering little (to no) pay, long hours, and impoverished working conditions. Also known as the proletariat, these unhappy workers must be well-organised and well-led for a class to become a class-for-itself as opposed to a class-in-itself. Obviously, this was not the case in Bangkok. The workers were insufficiently disenfranchised, they were inadequately led, and the State was not a horrible, repressive, ogre of persecution. In other words, life in Bangkok is neither solitary, poor, brutish, nasty nor short.

Class Welfare

Rather than class war, it appears that for most of the country, the State, led by Abhisit, had managed the limited insurgency very well with the kind of class-welfare for the injured and those who properties and businesses were affected. To its credit, the State announced provisions for a 778 million baht fund to help those in the Lumphini-Rajprasong area. Over 27,000 workers and 1,500 businesses were affected. The affected areas amounted to less than 2% of Bangkok Municipality but also accounts for over 60% of central Bangkok’s revenue. The State also approved in principle several banks’ requests for aid.

To its credit, the State delayed land and home taxes in the affected areas till September 2010 as well as postponed corporate tax and VAT payments for retailers who had their businesses closed but were still paying rent and workers’ salaries. Abhisit effectively used this class-welfare strategy to turn the tide against the Red Shirt insurgents.

Will Thaksin return?

For a class war to emerge, the rural areas have to be captured before the metropolitan urban centre (in Bangkok). The failure to effectively stage a class war in the rural areas had doomed the Red Shirt insurgency from the beginning. The Red Shirts would have won if they had captured Ayutthaya, Chaiyaphum, Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Chonburi, Khon Kaen, Nakhon Ratchasima, Nakhon Sawan, Nan, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Samut Prakan, Si Sa Ket, and Udon Thani before capturing Bangkok. Thaksin’s obvious absence merely postpones the fate of his fledgling followers.

Over the next few months, Thaksin has one final chance to return and lead his followers. Meanwhile, the Red Shirts will morph into another kind of entity before the next election. The Red Shirts may have lost the battle at Lumphini-Rajprasong, but they have not yet lost the war.

In Bangkok Dangerous, Nicholas Cage playing the American assassin, lost his emotions, anonymity, became careless, and asked questions. Prime Minister Abhisit on the other hand won hands down at Lumphini-Rajprasong because he didn’t lose his political nerve.

Unfortunately, catchy but misleading statements as that above, when made by academics such as yourself, are often picked up by foreign media and used to background what is in fact an incredibly complex set of circumstances and events.

Also, you alluded to the fact that under the 2007 constitution the electoral system reverted in some senses to that of 1995. I think I would be hard pressed to find one Thai in ten who could adequately explain the system or how it has changed over the years; of course the same widespread ignorance of the ‘nuts and bolts of democracy’ applies in many Western countries as well.

On your point about the prohibition of the expression of opposition to the constitution I think it is fair to argue that it is important to attempt to restrain political parties from engaging in a propaganda campaign around a constitutional referendum. I do recall documents providing a ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ case being distributed in the lead up to the referendum.

Importantly, people were free to boycott the referendum and the elections but a majority didn’t, so I think there was an attempt and desire by politicians and voters alike to restore ‘democracy’. I don’t think anybody believed the 2007 Constitution would forever remain the constitution of Thailand, but it was a step along the path of restoring democratic processes. The inability of the parliament since that time to agree to how to formulate a new charter is another story which has all but disappeared and been subsumed by more recent events.

As for the way the constitution was approved, recall that serious restrictions were placed on the ability to campaign for NO votes, while the military aggressively pushed YES votes (still they lost in Isan, while the vote was close in the North). Also, recall that the junta said at the time that if the referendum had failed, the military would have been free to re-introduce any of the (many) constitutions Thailand has used in the past decades. Among them are some rather illiberal constitutions, so it made sense to go along with the current draft (even for some opponents of the junta) and possibly try to change the constitution at a later time (did not happen thanks to the intervention of PAD and the courts).

All in all, I wouldn’t say that the 2007 elections were “undemocratic.” They were acceptable by international standards, but it is important to recognize that they took place in a context where the playing field had been tilted as much as feasible in the favor of the Democrats (or, perhaps more precisely, against the PPP). My point was not that the 2007 elections mean nothing; quite the opposite. The point was that the conduct of the election possibly depressed the gap between PPP and the Democrats in terms of both votes and seats, because the deck was in many ways stacked against the PPP.

Yes the coup was a military coup, but the ‘new rules’ did not alter the way elections are held in Thailand. You neglect to mention that the new constitution was put to a referendum in August 2007 and was ratified. In other words, Thai people voted for the new constitution. Are you implying that the 2007 elections were undemocratic? How would you suggest the transition from coup to democracy should have been managed? Former TRT politicians were happy to contest the election and were up to their old tricks; they could have boycotted it. The constitutional referendum could have been boycotted by voters, but there was a 70% voter turn-out.

My concern regarding the Red Shirts is that they are, as McCargo has suggested, a patronage network driven by “personal loyalties and emotional attachments” rather than a movement with any underlying ideology, and that their political leadership (the Peua Thai Party) lacks credibility.

I would not suggest that the people who protested were paid lackeys or that they do not have anything to protest about. Clearly, Thailand is riven by inequality. However, I do not see how the Red Shirt movement can lead to a fairer society given their political leadership.

Thailand, like many developing countries, has for years been a dysfunctional democracy. This has been well documented (e.g. Corruption and Democracy in Thailand). The leaders of the Peua Thai Party, it seems to me, are some of the worst examples of why Thailand’s democracy is so dysfunctional. When we talk of double standards, and the outrageous way the rich can get away with almost anything in Thailand, surely we are talking about the likes of Chalerm and Chavalit?

The Red Shirts could, as you and many other people seem to believe, represent a progressive political movement. However, when I look at the Peua Thai Party, I can’t help wondering if they could not be more accurately described as a reactionary movement supporting the interests of various regional godfathers who wish to maintain their access to state coffers.

In Jamaica, a bloody battle is taking place as the authorities seek to arrest the drug lord “Dudus” Coke. He is apparently very popular in the neighbourhood of Kingston where this is taking place. While I understand why such people become popular, criminals are not the answer to the problems of the poor in the developing world.

Now, with regard to the election results. Those elections took place under military rule, according to rules designed by people hand-picked by the junta, and in a context where Mr. Abhisit had the full backing of the state and the military. If anything, my guess is that the final result probably understates the gap that existed between the Democrat Party and the PPP in terms of voter preferences. As for the vote buying, I never quite believed it sways that many votes (though it might get people to the polls); either way, the Democrat Party routinely uses much the same practices (it’s just more likely to get the blind eye treatment from the authorities). As for the poll by Bangkok University, it looks like a load of BS to me. In fact, see here for a comprehensive discussion of various polls taken prior to the 2007 elections:

http://bangkokpundit.blogspot.com/2007/12/further-evidence-of-sinking-poll.html

I have never been a fan of Thaksin (much less Samak). And, in the interest of full disclosure, I was hoping they would lose at the time. But it looks to me like the 2007 elections were won fair and square; in fact, in a context where the deck was stacked against the PPP.